Amanda Torrie
Greek Independent Stude
Nichamakhean Ehikv
Oktober 2008 A.D.E
Virtue is a potent ideal in every culture, but each culture has its own idea of what virtue means. Each culture rewards Virtue with rewards. Our rewards in the United States for being virtuous can mean rewards after this life is over. Not being virtuous brings penalties, again most probably in the afterlife. A virtuous person probably exercises personal sacrifice and self discipline to accomplish the moral standard. The question would be in our country that is so diverse with so many different ideas about morality, who or what has the right to decide what is and is not virtuous? Who sets our standard?
Aristotle’s ( 384-322BCE[1]) works fall into two categories. The philosophical dialogues which were actually published. The other scientific treatises that were made from his students’ notes of his oral teachings and kept in the school’s library. His philosophical works are completely lost. What’s left are extant works of a specific discourse that loosely put together into a treatise. Nichomachean Ethics, which is named after his son who died in battle, is considered to be the authoritative statement of Aristotle’s system. For many reasons too big to cover in this paper, I believe this is a good primary source for exploring Western Civilization’s foundations for a definition of Virtue.
This last summer (June – August 2008) Dr. Shellko and I attempted to translate the first chapter of the third book of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics as translated by H. Rackham in 1926, revised 1934, consisting of 27 sections. Naturally my own lack of experience slowed us way down so we actually only completed 18 of the 27 sections. Through the translation, predictably we discovered that Mr. Rackham’s translation was an interpretation more than a translation and reflected the morality of his time. I’d love to write a paper about the differences we found, but instead will keep to the topic of Virtue which is what I set out to do when I first asked Dr. Kirk Shellko to help me with this project.
I am hoping after 18 sections I can develop a defensible definition of Virtue and its relationship with what is and is not voluntary.
here is a disagreement about what are willed things and what are unwilled things; what sort of things are done on account of fear of the greater wickedness* or on account some noble thing as if a tyrant might have commanded someone to do something shameful while that tyrant being an overlord while being master over his parents and children and on the one hand once the person having done it, the tyrant would save them, and on the other hand if he didn’t act the tyrant would kill his parents and/or children.
Some thing of this sort happens regarding the storm throwing over things; simply on the one hand no one throws away cargo willingly; those who possess their minds deliver themselves and quite every thing remaining (on the ship).
* Wickedness for Aristotle means formless. Shape created limits which is the beginning of presence.
Actions of this sort then are mixed and rather like voluntary actions, (for they are chosen when they are done); the completion of an action is at the right time must be said when (it) is done whether voluntary or involuntary; the person acted with free will (If you can say it is voluntary, then it might be voluntary); also the origin of the movement has a share in such action in it; the beginning of which is in a thing is willed, out side a thing is unwilled, and willing to do it or not. Such acts are voluntary, and simply perhaps involuntary. For nobody would choose in his own
right any such thing of this sort.
Regarding actions of this sort, sometimes men are praised. Sometimes they tolerate shameful and painful things for the sake of great and find things for they are blamed in respect of motive by abiding for no fine reason or for a trifle thing for it is shameful. Some times praise does come about. Consensus whenever such sort of things someone would do things not needed. No one who strained his human nature would abide by it.
Perhaps it is not possible to be compelled, but death must come about for the one who suffers; and yet it appears laughable the most terrible things Euripidou of Alkmaona having been compelled to commit matricide.
It is difficult sometimes to judge what sort of thing is placed, what sort of thing ought to be chosen [We have to decide what is worse – what you are expected to suffer and what are ou willing to endure or die – what is expected or not expected to suffer to maintain your virtue]; it is still more difficult for those with knowledge to remain for most times the penalty is painful; things which are compelling are shameful. Because of these things praises and blames come about concerning those who have or have not been compelled.
Must it be said then what sort of things are forced? Is it simply things that are constrained whenever the cause in them would be outside and the one acting would contribute nothing? And yet on the one hand regarding one’s self is not voluntary and now versus that thing being chosen, and the source of the action from one’s self not voluntary, and now against those things chosen. [The things of themselves are willed and are chosen in place of these things here or these things now, the origin in the things acting. Rather they are like the willing for the actions in them according each case, these things are willed. What in place of what is must be chosen. It’s not easy to determine for there are many difference in them individually.
If when pleasure and nobility someone says to be forced (to be compelled from the outside), then all of the action would be forced. For the sake of these everyone does everything. And some on the one hand are unwilling by force are painful, and the ones through sweetness and beauty come about. It is laughable to blame external things, but not to blame oneself for being hunted by these things.
It seems in fact the forced thing exists from where the outside is the origin, and the person having been compelled contributing nothing to it.
On the one hand, an act done in ignorance is not voluntary in every way, on the other hand it is involuntary when in pain and regret. For the one having acted through ignorance hasn’t acted willingly with respect to the thing in the action he doesn’t know, yet not in pain. A person would seem repentant the one not regretted for his own sake, otherwise, it is not free will; for as the situation is different, it is best to have a personal name for it.
*In otherwords, a person is not acting willingly if he is ignorant about what he is doing. Nor is he acting willingly if he is forced to a decision through pain. That action is not about free will but about not being in pain. Each situation is different and every person has their own ideas about this and should label it themselves.
As would be expected, action through ignorance seems to be different than producing in ignorance; for does a person who is intoxicated or angry seem to act in ignorance but as been said, knowing and yet ignorant. To act through ignorance is not completely miserable and one must abstain, on account this sort of error,* they become unjust and wholly wicked.
*This becomes an intellectual mistake
The involuntary thing is not right to say if someone is ignorant of the things that are happening. Neither cause of the whole (for they find fault for the ignorance in the choice which is not the cause of the unwilling but ignorance of the cause of the wickedness) but is the cause; nor is it the ignorance of which they are blamed on account of that ignorance, but it is the ignorance according to each situation. For in these circumstances both pity and pardon exist; one who is ignorant of something of these things acts unwillingly.
*Basically Aristotle didn’t believe people could act wickedly unless they were ignorant about what they were doing. I believe he was convinced that the order of the universe was natural for all life. To act outside of this natural order was probably wicked, but only when they didn’t know any better.
Both who and in fact what and concerning what or in what he acts. Sometimes with what like with a tool and for the sake of what like for the sake of deliverance and how like softly or strenuously.
No one who is not mad would be ignorant of quite all those things, it is clear that the one doing them would no be ignorant of what he is doing. It would be possible for a man to be ignorant when they say the words would fall out (ejkpesei:n – fall out) while he was speaking. Or they say they didn’t know it was unsaid just like Aisculos said of the mysteries or they say while wishing to show it, it went away as the one said with respect to the Catapult case; or a man would imagine his son to be the enemy just as Merope’s mistake and [sharp spear (dovru) or on a button], or a stone to be a pumice stone; and regarding saving a person who would kill him having given a potion to save he might kill him; or in wrestling wishing to grip him would not grip but hit is more unwilling acts.
Regarding all such circumstances of one’s own ignorance in circumstance of the actions. The person of those actions is ignorant appears as voluntary actions and with the greatest authority; or to seem to be an authority; in the circumstance of the actions, and yet not voluntary.
Those involuntary acts that were said to be ignorant were first painful and then repented.
